

THE MAINTENANCE OF UNITED STATES
AIR POWER

STATEMENT

OF

HON. THOMAS K. FINLETTER
SECRETARY, UNITED STATES AIR FORCE

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES OF THE
COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS

RELATIVE TO

H. R. 7391, WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO APPROPRIA-
TIONS OF THE UNITED STATES AIR FORCE, OF THE
DEFENSE DEPARTMENT APPROPRIATION BILL OF 1952



PRESENTED BY MR. O'MAHONEY

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HON. THOMAS K. ENGLISH

SENATOR, UNITED STATES AIR FORCE

THROUGH THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES OF THE
COMMITTEE ON AIRPORTS

RELATIVE TO

IN A CASE WHEREBY AIRPORTS ARE TO AIRPORTS
OF THE UNITED STATES AIR FORCE OF THE
MAINTENANCE OF AIRPORTS BILL OF 1933



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FOREWORD

Testifying before the Senate Subcommittee on Defense Appropriations on May 26 and 29, 1952, Secretary of the United States Air Force, Hon. Thomas K. Finletter, declared in unreserved terms that the reduction of American air power can be justified on neither military nor economic grounds. He asserted that unless the requested appropriations of \$20.7 billion are granted the United States will lose at least 2 years in the planned build-up of a 143 wing air force.

The air strength which in the judgment of the Joint Chiefs of Staff should be achieved by July 1, 1954, will not be available until June 30, 1957, with funds for the fiscal year 1953 as limited in the House appropriation bill. Meanwhile, the Soviet build-up of air power continues. The Soviet Migs which are appearing daily in increased numbers over Korea are jet-powered defensive aircraft, the production of which, from the manufacture of the engine to the delivery of the plane, must have been started not less than 18 months ago.

The subcommittee felt that the details of Secretary Finletter's analysis of the program are so important that his statement should be made a Senate document. It is, accordingly, here presented for the consideration of the Members of the Senate.

The testimony of the Navy with respect to air power will be heard later.

JOSEPH C. O'MAHERNEY,
*Chairman, Subcommittee on
Department of Defense Appropriations.*

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UNITED STATES AIR FORCE

Presentation to the Committee on Appropriations, United States Senate, Budget Estimates, Fiscal Year 1953

STATEMENT OF HON. THOMAS K. FINLETTER, SECRETARY, UNITED STATES AIR FORCE

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I come to this committee today with a more urgent plea than I have ever brought to it before. Hitherto I have always said that the amount of money being granted to the Air Force was about right. I told you of the risks we were taking by doing no more than was planned, but never before have I been compelled to say that the odds in the gamble were literally too great to be accepted. Now, however, I must put clearly on record my belief that the cuts made in the Air Force appropriations by the House would so weaken our defenses as to put this country in a critically dangerous position. I believe that we have come to the point of decision as to whether or not the United States is going to have the kind of Air Force that is absolutely indispensable to its security.

Our hopes of peace are staked today on the building of a defense force strong enough to deter aggression. Rightly we dislike the whole idea of rearmament; we dislike the drafting of young men for military service; we dislike the economic costs of the program. But at this time we have no other choice. If we do enough and our policy succeeds in averting the catastrophe of an all-out global war, our investments in preparedness will have brought returns of immeasurable value. If we fail to do enough, our short-run economies will have cost us dearly. That is the broad setting in which, I think, the Air Force budget must be considered.

Last October the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Secretaries in the Department of Defense agreed on the necessity of bringing the Air Force up to a strength of 143 modern wings by July 1, 1954. This was done in the light of all intelligence reports available at that time, and nothing in any subsequent reports has given us reason to think the need less urgent. The whole 143-wing force is calculated with respect to the capabilities of our possible enemies as of July 1, 1954.

The budget as submitted to Congress extended the readiness date about a year—to July 1955. Now the House cuts would push back by about another 2 years the time when we would have the kind of Air Force that we ought to have for our security right now. This is not compatible with the national interest.

This final postponement is not attributable to production or recruitment problems. With the appropriations asked for we could have the planned force by July 1955. We have, therefore, a clear choice before us. If our policy of preparedness is to succeed in its

high objective of preserving peace by convincing potential aggressors that war against us would not pay, we must show our determination to carry through this program without faltering. We cannot afford to be without the planes and the pilots and the weapons and the equipment that could be obtained with the money which the House has cut from the Air Force budget. Nor can we afford the discount that others will put on our strength if we show signs of wavering in carrying through the job we have started.

I do not think that the people of this country are of the wavering kind. And it is clear from the record that the House did not intend to cut the fighting power of the Air Force. Misunderstandings, I am sure, have been involved in the decisions which were reached. These must be cleared away. That is why I wish now to discuss these cuts in detail.

I shall stress particularly the extent to which the cuts postpone the date of readiness of the Air Force. One may perhaps dispute, case by case, the delaying effect of any one of the many individual cuts which result from the House action. In some cases the damage may be greater than my statement shows; in others it may perhaps be less. These are not mathematically ascertainable facts. I have simply made the best judgment in each instance of which I am capable. But quite apart from the details there is one point on which I am absolutely sure and that is that these cuts do extend the period of our unpreparedness well beyond the middle of 1955 and that every minute of extension beyond that date involves a risk which I feel it my duty to advise this committee is one which is dangerous to the security of this country.

I. GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS

In my earlier appearance before your committee, I discussed the effect of the Smith amendment (sec. 638 of H. R. 7391) and, in general terms, the effect of budget cuts as approved by the House for the fiscal year 1953 appropriations for the Air Force. With the committee's permission, I shall now discuss in more detail the effects of the House cuts in appropriations on the 143-wing program of the Air Force.

CHRONOLOGY OF BUDGET ESTIMATES

Two steps preceded the House reduction in the Air Force's appropriations.

First was the Air Force budget as approved by the Secretary of Defense and forwarded to the Bureau of the Budget. This budget amounted to \$55 billion for the three services in the Department of Defense. The Air Force share of this was \$21.4 billion for all purposes except public works. This budget would have bought the United States a substantially modernized Air Force of 143 wings by the end of fiscal year 1954.

The next step was a reduction in this over-all defense budget to \$52.1 billion and the reduction of the Air Force share (for all purposes except public works) to \$20.7 billion. This reduction was the result of a decision which gave effect not only to military matters, but also to economic, political, and other aspects of the program. The Air Force was accordingly directed to take its part in holding the combined expenditures of the Department of Defense and the military portion of the foreign-aid program to "less than \$60 billion" during the fiscal year 1953. As a result of this limitation on expenditures, accompanied by a reduction in obligational authority to the Air Force from \$21.4 billion to \$20.7 billion, the date of readiness of the 143-wing force was moved forward to approximately the end of fiscal year 1955.

The next step was the cut the House has made in the \$20.7 billion. The House cut \$1,677,965,858 from the \$20.7 billion, leaving a balance of \$19,022,034,142.

EFFECT OF HOUSE REDUCTIONS

As I have already said to this committee, the effect of these House reductions quite apart from the effect of the Smith amendment (sec. 638 of H. R. 7391) would be to delay the coming into being of the 143-wing force from the end of fiscal year 1955 to the end of fiscal year 1957.

Readiness in midcalendar 1957 is wholly wrong for a force originally planned for and needed in midcalendar 1954. There is attached a chart, which I have discussed previously with this committee, which shows the date of readiness of the Air Force (1) in accordance with the original submission by the Department of Defense, (2) in accordance with the Bureau of the Budget submission to the Congress, and (3) after giving effect to the House appropriation bill.

The Air Force is asking for the restitution of practically all of the cut of \$1,677,965,858. It is asking for the restitution of \$1,644,420,858. The figures are set forth in the following table:

Air Force fiscal year 1953 appropriation (exclusive of public works)

Detail	Fiscal year 1953 estimate	House reduction	Air Force reclama
Aircraft and related procurement:			
Total appropriation.....	\$12,685,044,000	\$560,000,000	\$560,000,000
Less cash for liquidation of prior year contract authority.....	1,685,044,000		
New obligating authority.....	11,000,000,000	560,000,000	
Major procurement other than aircraft.....	1,300,000,000	300,000,000	300,000,000
Acquisition and construction of real property:			
Total appropriation.....	45,334,770		
Less cash for liquidation of prior year contract authority.....	45,334,770		
New obligating authority.....			
Maintenance and operations.....	4,389,817,000	628,026,858	627,681,858
Military personnel requirements.....	3,300,000,000	167,739,000	136,739,000
Research and development.....	525,000,000		
Reserve personnel requirements.....	28,396,000	2,200,000	
Air National Guard.....	116,000,000	10,000,000	10,000,000
Contingencies.....	40,787,000	10,000,000	10,000,000
Total appropriation.....	22,430,378,770	1,677,965,858	1,644,420,858
Less cash for liquidation of prior year contract authority.....	1,730,378,770		
New obligating authority.....	20,700,000,000	1,677,965,858	1,644,420,858

The committee may inquire why cuts of less than \$2 billion out of a total appropriation of more than \$20 billion would have these serious consequences. It is the purpose of my presentation today to answer this question.

INTERDEPENDENCE OF PROGRAM ELEMENTS

There are two main reasons why the House cuts have this effect. The first reason is that the major elements of this Air Force program, such as personnel, aircraft procurement, maintenance and operation, and so on, are interdependent. You can't reduce one without affecting the others. All these elements together make up a single program, single in its relationship as between the items and single with reference to a certain point in time with respect to which they are all calculated.

For example, the amount of military personnel is carefully estimated with respect to the number of airplanes that will be in Air Force wings on a certain date. The training program is calculated with a relation to the personnel which are needed to man the operating planes. The number of wings are related to the base structure, and so on. In each instance, as I have said, the timing is so arranged as to bring the whole force into operation at a point in time which dominates the whole program.

The point that I wish to make to you here is that this is a sensitive program and that cuts in one segment of it necessarily have their effect on most of the other segments of the integrated whole.

TIGHTNESS OF BUDGET AS SUBMITTED

The second reason why the cuts of less than \$2 billion have this effect of pushing the date of readiness out into 1957 is that the program

submitted by the military establishment is an extremely tight one. It has no fat in it to take care of the cuts without damaging the force structure which we are trying to build. The Air Force is in a way paying the penalty for our attempt to present to the Congress the most strictly efficient budget of which we were capable.

VOLUNTARY ELIMINATION OF AIRCRAFT RESERVES

For example, the number of aircraft called for by the \$11 billion request for fiscal year 1953 is exactly the number of aircraft that are necessary to modernize the 143-wing Air Force by midcalendar 1955. There are absolutely no planes left over beyond those necessary to equip this force. There are no reserves whatsoever for combat attrition. Thus if we have a certain number of medium bomb wings of 45 aircraft per wing, we will have exactly 45 aircraft and no more for each wing.

If, as undoubtedly would be the case if these forces were committed to combat, there should be a serious attrition, the number of available fighting aircraft would go down very rapidly and could not possibly be made up out of current production. There would, in short, be a drastic downward curve in the number of aircraft available to fight between the time a war started and the time, a year or more later, when increased production would begin to catch up on combat losses.

This was a risky decision to make, to recommend a budget which contained no aircraft reserves for combat attrition. The reason for this risky decision was that we wished to submit the tightest possible budget.

VOLUNTARY REDUCTION IN MANNING LEVELS

The same thing is true of military personnel. This item, along with the items of "Aircraft procurement" and "Maintenance and operations," are the most expensive items in the Air Force budget. We have made a real drive to limit our military personnel figure.

The figures speak for themselves. With an increase in combat striking power from 95 wings, the present authorized level, to 143 wings, we have provided in this budget for an increase in "Military personnel" of only 14 percent—from 1,061,000 for the 95-wing force to 1,210,000 for the 143-wing force.

The Air Staff study which produced this drastic reduction in "Military personnel" was thorough. It was made by a committee headed, under the instructions of the Chief of Staff and myself, by Dr. Edmund P. Learned, professor at Harvard Business School and now on duty with the Air Force in a civilian capacity. The instructions to Dr. Learned were to produce the tightest possible military personnel program. He has done so. Dr. Learned will testify later about his study.

My main point is that this "Military personnel" item is extremely sensitive. Just as in aircraft, there is no fat here to absorb the House cuts. They must be applied to the actual reduction of the already minimum number of people available to fly the planes.

The cut in "Military personnel" is most damaging.

II. THE ITEM OF MILITARY PERSONNEL

Now to discuss the cuts in some detail.

I will talk first of the details of the cut of \$136,739,000 in "Military personnel."

The Air Force budget for military personnel, as approved by the Department of Defense and the Bureau of the Budget and submitted to the Congress, was \$3.3 billion. The House Committee on Appropriations recommended a cut of \$150,000,000 from this figure. The House floor added \$17,739,000 more to the cut, making a total reduction of \$167,739,000 in the bill as passed. The Air Force believes that it can accept \$31,000,000 of this cut without interfering with the date of readiness or its operations: I will explain why later in this presentation. The Air Force believes, however, that it must get back the balance of \$136,739,000 if it is to get to a modernized 143-wing force by midcalendar 1955. Let me explain why.

RECRUITING CAPABILITIES

In the first place I believe that the reduction which the House committee made may have been made under the misapprehension that the Air Force was not able to recruit the number of military personnel which it had programed, namely its year-end strength targets of 973,000 for June 30, 1952, and 1,061,000 for June 30, 1953. The House said the following on this subject:

In recommending a reduction of \$150,000,000 from the three billion three hundred million requested for military personnel requirements, the committee *does not intend to reduce by one single person the military strength requested.* It has not been possible during the current year for the Air Force to recruit the estimated strength and it may not be attained during the coming fiscal year, but if it is possible the committee intends to provide funds for the necessary requirements of a total year-end strength of 1,061,000.¹ [Italics added.]

I take it that this means that the committee (1) doubted that we would be able to get to 1,061,000 by June 30, 1953, and (2) intended that, if we were able to get to this figure, the necessary funds would be provided, presumably by supplemental appropriations during fiscal year 1953.

As to this I make three points.

First, there is no doubt about our ability to get to this figure by end fiscal year 1953. We have been recruiting during current fiscal year 1952, at a faster rate than will be necessary to maintain during fiscal year 1953 in order to reach this figure of 1,061,000.²

Second, the suggestion of waiting for a supplemental appropriation to take care of this military personnel item simply will not work. If we get only the money for the "Military personnel" item which is available to us after the House cuts, we will actually reduce the number of military personnel on duty on July 1, 1952, by about 9,000 during the fiscal year 1953.

¹ Explanatory notes of House Committee on Appropriations, p. 71.

² Some of the misapprehension about our prophesied failure to meet recruiting goals in 1953 may have come from the fact that in the hearings before the House committee we showed that we planned to return some of the "Military personnel" item money which was appropriated by the Congress for 1952.

What happened was this. After the Congress had appropriated the money for us in 1952, we revised downward our military personnel end strength targets, by voluntary action on our part. It therefore followed that we had some money left over at the end of the year. This situation was not caused by our inability to recruit personnel. It was caused by deliberate reduction of end strength military personnel.

The reason for the reduction was that it was part of the general program of reduction of personnel manning standards directed by the Chief of Staff and myself to which I have referred above in the statement.

Third, the element of "military personnel" is interdependent with all sorts of other items in the Air Force program—such as training installations, operational and supply bases, aircraft, etc. If we are not to get an unbalanced program—such as having a lot of airplanes which we will not be able to fly—we have to know at the beginning of the planning period how much money we have for each item. The method of picking up items by supplementals disarranges all orderly planning and is costly to the Government.

The foregoing is my main argument for asking for the restoration of this \$136,739,000 cut in military personnel; namely, that the basic premise on which the House cut was made is not sustainable.

I shall now discuss the nature of this cut in some detail.

At the outset let me make reference to a specific kind of reduction, in the amount of \$175,765,858 which was made on the floor of the House. I emphasize that this cut was made on the floor and was not recommended by the committee. Indeed it was resisted by the chairman of the committee from the floor.

NO THIRD SUPPLY PIPELINE

The reductions in question purported to be for the purpose of preventing the Air Force from setting up a "third supply pipeline, an unnecessary and wasteful duplication." The amounts involved in this cut, intended to prevent the so-called "third supply pipeline" were as follows:

Military personnel.....	\$17, 739, 000
Maintenance and operations.....	28, 026, 858
Major procurement other than aircraft.....	130, 000, 000
Total.....	175, 765, 858

The reason given for the \$130,000,000 cut in "Major procurement other than aircraft" was based simply on the theory that there were some concealed funds in this item which could be reduced by the simple determination of the Air Force not to set up a "third supply pipeline." The fact is there is no "third supply pipeline." The Air Force buys only on its own account items peculiar to its operations, such as aircraft and similar specialized articles. The common supply items are purchased by the Army or the Navy for us. There may be some minor exceptions where efficiency or some other practical reason indicates that there should be. But the basic point is that there is no "third supply pipeline."

Furthermore, as I have said, the Appropriations Committee did not recommend any such cuts, and I urgently suggest that this committee not consider any such reduction without a full examination of the facts. It would be most unfortunate to cut this item under a misapprehension.

The same thing applies to the other two cuts—\$17,739,000 for "Military personnel" and \$28,026,858 for "Maintenance and operations." These cuts are both personnel cuts. The \$17,739,000 was intended to come out of "Military personnel" alleged to be in this "third supply pipeline," and the \$28,026,858 to come out of "Maintenance and operations" was intended to reduce the number of civilian personnel alleged to be part of this "third supply pipeline."

For the foregoing reason I recommend that all of these items be restored.

WASTEFUL DUPLICATION CAREFULLY AVOIDED

At the risk of repetition, I would like to emphasize that the Air Force is not setting up a new supply system. Nor is there any intention of duplicating any existing supply function. Under the National Security Act of 1947 the services are authorized to adjust the existing supply systems with the intention of securing maximum services as well as producing the most efficient and economical system. Since that time changes in the procedure for receiving, storing, and issuing of supplies have been made in the interest of efficiency and economy, all in accordance with directives of the Secretary of Defense and within the intent of the National Security Act. The Air Force believes in this servicing whenever it produces greater efficiency or economy. In certain parts of the world, indeed, the Air Force renders complete supply support for the Army as well as the Air Force. There are a number of other places in the world where the Air Force is pretty much on its own, or at least is in a primary position. In these areas we are compelled to accept full responsibility for distribution. I repeat, however, the basic point that the Air Force has no intention of duplicating any existing supply function. On the contrary it firmly and enthusiastically supports the idea of getting as much servicing done by the other services as possible in the interest of being able to devote itself to the business of flying airplanes.

Mr. Gilpatric will cover this matter more fully.

DISTRIBUTION OF MILITARY PERSONNEL APPROPRIATION

The Military Personnel item is broken down as follows:

	Fiscal year 1953 AF estimates	House reduction	AF reclama
Total.....	\$3,300,000,000	\$167,739,000	\$3,269,000,000
Pay and allowances.....	2,805,000,000		2,787,000,000
Subsistence.....	327,397,000		314,397,000
Travel.....	161,672,000		161,672,000
Other military requirements such as welfare of enlisted men, chaplain's supplies, apprehension of deserters and interest on enlisted men's deposits.....	5,310,000		5,310,000

FLYING PAY

The committee will note that by far the biggest amount is "Pay and allowances." This item is fixed by act of Congress and, I take it, is not under debate, with the possible exception of flying pay.

I hope very much that this committee will not weaken this all-important part of our Air Force program.

I point out to the committee that on page 72 of the explanatory notes of the House Appropriations Committee the committee did take exception to two points about flight pay.³ First, they argued that the

³ The exact language of the committee's remarks is as follows:

"In the opinion of the committee the criteria followed by the services with respect to flight pay are unrealistic and must be revised. Personnel in the older age brackets are retained in a flying status in many instances which in the opinion of the committee cannot be justified. The duties of high-ranking officers in administrative positions who in former years have performed flying duties cannot justify remaining in a flying status only for the purpose of flying a few hours per month. It is not necessary for such officers to be in a flying status and enjoy the benefits of flying pay to perform administrative duties. If their administrative duties require the retention of flying skills the type of flying they would do by flying only 4 hours per month would scarcely retain such skills. The committee believes that the amount requested in the budget for flight pay is excessive and with better administration a sizable reduction can be made."

personnel in the older age brackets should not be allowed to get flying pay, and second, that administrative duty officers should not be allowed to maintain their proficiency and receive flying pay for doing so.

I must take exception to these two points of the House committee.

First, about the older officers. Less than 1 percent of the officers of the Air Force are over 45 years of age. These senior officers who maintain their flying proficiency are either in the operational commands at the moment or are subject to being sent to the operational commands on a moment's notice. It is of the utmost importance that these senior officers, as long as they are active, should be able to fly an airplane. You cannot have Air Force flying commands under the direction of officers who do not know how to take off, fly, and land an airplane. This is indispensable to morale.

Secondly, about the so-called proficiency flying of officers in administrative positions. These officers, who may be on administrative duty in the Pentagon or some other place, may at any moment be sent to a command or to combat in Korea or anywhere else. These men are an indispensable combat reserve. They have to keep up their flying skill because that is what they are in the Air Force for. We must think, therefore, of these officers not as administrative men but as men who may go at any moment to a flying command. Obviously they must know how to fly.

The committee may be interested in the fact that the regulation of the President under the Career Compensation Act of 1949 provided for 4 hours a month flying duty only; and it is this regulation to which the House committee's report, quoted above, refers when it speaks of 4 hours a month flying. However, the Air Force requires officers who are to receive flying pay to fly at least 100 hours a year and to meet yearly technical and physical qualifications.

I think therefore the House committee was under a misapprehension when it stated:

If their administrative duties require the retention of flying skills the type of flying they would do by flying only 4 hours per month would scarcely retain such skills.

I urge very seriously that no cut in flying pay be made in this appropriation. If the committee is of a mind to consider this question, I would like to develop the matter further because it is my belief that flying pay must be increased rather than diminished.

PAY AND ALLOWANCES

The committee will note that the Air Force has revised its estimates of the item of "Pay and allowances" from \$2,805,000,000 to \$2,787,000,000, a reduction, accepted by the Air Force, of \$18,000,000. This \$18,000,000 saving has been accomplished by recomputing clothing allowances based on revised cost estimates made by the Secretary of Defense. Subsequent to the submission of the initial Air Force budget estimates clothing prices have generally declined. The revised estimate in savings reflects this reduction.

Two other items of "Military personnel," although smaller in amount, may be worthy of attention.

SUBSISTENCE

Subsistence estimates by the three services were based on the assumption that food prices would reach and maintain a new high during fiscal 1953. This assumption was made because the Bureau of Labor Statistics wholesale food index had reached a high of 190 at the time the assumption was made. However, during the period Congress was reviewing the Army budget, the Bureau of Labor Statistics food price index dropped from 190 to 185.1. Army subsistence funds were reduced on the basis of this trend and as a consequence the subsistence standards for all three services were reduced, using the revised Army rate as the basis. As a result of this recomputation the Air Force subsistence budget has been revised downward by \$13,000,000.

TRAVEL

The next biggest item is "Travel." Travel means the actual out-of-pocket expenses to move officers and airmen from one place to another when they have to move in performance of their official duties. These expenses are of two kinds. First, actual payments to railroads, bus lines, and commercial airlines, and in a few instances to commercial shipping lines, to pay for the actual cost of movement. Second, per diem charges calculated to cover the actual expenses of officers and airmen in transit. I do not see how any money can be saved out of this item.

What are the vulnerable items in this travel account? I have looked into this. The Air Force is governed by Joint Travel Regulations issued by the Department of Defense, applicable to all services, and agreed to by the Bureau of the Budget. Under these regulations dependents receive a mileage of 6 cents per mile for adults and 3 cents for children. This seems to me to be right. It is the policy to have the dependents go with the officers and airmen whenever the local situation permits it.

Another point has been made that perhaps we are luxurious in allowing officers and airmen to have pullman sleeper travel when overnight jumps are involved. This is a very small amount and it is standard practice in all the services. It does not seem to me to be wrong.

I will not take the time of the committee to discuss the item of \$5,310,000 relating to "Other military requirements" in the "Military personnel" item.

My conclusion is that no cut is possible in "Pay and allowances" unless the number of military personnel in the Air Force is to be reduced, which the House committee expressly said it did not want to do.

REQUEST FOR RESTORATION

I request the restoration of the entire \$136,739,000 of the Air Force reclama. Otherwise, the 143 wing force readiness date will be extended to midcalendar 1957.

III. THE ITEM OF MAINTENANCE AND OPERATIONS

Restitution of the \$136,739,000 in "Military personnel" would eliminate this obstacle to the modernization of the 143-wing Air Force, but would not of itself assure the attainment of this force by the middle of calendar year 1955.

The next most damaging cut, after that in "Military personnel," would be the cut in "Maintenance and operations." For this item the Air Force asked for \$4,389,817,000. The House committee recommended a reduction of \$600,000,000 and House floor action reduced it by another \$28,026,858. The Air Force is asking for a restoration of practically all of this cut, namely, for \$627,681,858.

DISTRIBUTION OF MAINTENANCE AND OPERATIONS APPROPRIATION

The following table analyzes the "Maintenance and operations" item:

	Fiscal year 1953 estimates	House reduction	Functions reduced	Acceptable reduction	Air Force reclamation
Total.....	\$4,389,817,000	\$628,026,858	\$627,681,858	\$345,000	\$627,681,858
Operation of aircraft.....	1,556,184,000	-----	180,000,000	None	-----
Organization, base and maintenance equipment and supplies.....	520,585,000	-----	120,000,000	None	-----
Logistical support.....	1,146,719,000	-----	163,026,858	None	-----
Training support.....	257,000,000	-----	60,000,000	None	-----
Operational support.....	569,009,000	-----	80,000,000	None	-----
Research and test support.....	82,000,000	-----	7,000,000	None	-----
Medical support.....	100,000,000	-----	15,000,000	None	-----
Service-wide support.....	158,320,000	345,000	2,655,000	345,000	-----

SERIOUS EFFECT OF REDUCTIONS

The reason why the cut in "Maintenance and operations" is so serious is that it would greatly impair the flying ability of the Air Force during fiscal year 1953 and, even though we got all the money we might need in fiscal 1954 and subsequent fiscal years, would cause a long-term damage to the ability of the Air Force to fly, the exact nature of which and the time extent of which are difficult to appraise.

The item of "Maintenance and operations" is what flies the Air Force. It provides for the procurement of aircraft spare parts and supplies, fuel and oil, contractual services for the modification and modernization of aircraft, and all the equipment and supplies which go into our air bases, which in turn support the flying forces. The "Maintenance and operations" item also furnishes the supplies and the distribution of all the materials at the depots. It also provides for the operation, repair, and minor construction of the Air Force bases from which the Air Force conducts its training, air defense, tactical, strategic, research, and medical activities.

This indicates the broad functions which are covered by this appropriation item. The fact that the area of activity which this item supports is so broad makes it difficult to pin point what would not be purchased or operated if the reduction in funds for this item is not restored.

The \$627,681,858 of the House cut in this item must be restored if we are to prevent serious loss of Air Force efficiency and effectiveness

not only during fiscal year 1953 but also in fiscal year 1954 and subsequent years. I have said before to this committee that the end of fiscal year 1954 is regarded as a critical point in time and that we ought to get as close to it in our readiness as possible.

DELAY IN DATE OF READINESS

The Air Force is making every effort to have maximum readiness by that time. Without the restoration of funds in the "Maintenance and operations" item we cannot reach this state of readiness. Stocks on hand at the end of fiscal 1953 would not be sufficient to support the proper flying program in fiscal 1954. Aircraft modification and mechanical deficiencies and changes to improve flying safety would either be deferred to 1954 or later years or canceled altogether. The reduction in funds would set up a lag in Air Force modification which could continue well beyond 1954. Logistical support of individual and unit training programs would be reduced and this would result in a reduction in both quantity and quality in our pilots and air crews scheduled to graduate from Air Force schools during fiscal year 1953 and 1954. The cut would also cause deficiencies in spare parts and equipment which in turn would cause an increase in the number of aircraft out of commission for lack of parts. And one of our major problems today is the adequate supply of spare parts, especially for our widely deployed overseas units.

In summary, the reduction of \$627,681,858 in "Maintenance and operations" funds would necessitate a critical slowing down in the level of Air Force activities through fiscal years 1953, 1954, and later years. Not only would the readiness of the force be affected during the fiscal year 1953, but the damage in the 1953 proficiency would extend out for many years thereafter. Just when it could be recouped—even with all the appropriations that might be asked for in later years—cannot be accurately prophesied.

QUALITY OF THE FORCE AFFECTED

"Maintenance and operations" is an item which is always hard to defend. The amounts are always large; and a cut does not result in the loss of a tangible asset such as an airplane or a pilot, the necessity for which is clear. "Maintenance and operation" is related to the quality of the force rather than to its quantity and it is therefore more difficult to explain. I will now try to do so.

The House explanatory notes on H. R. 7391, at page 67, make three points about this item, namely:

(1) The committee believed that "through better management, better utilization of the equipment and materials on hand, more careful supervision of all the activities a better service can be performed in the interest of the Nation. In the opinion of the committee there is scarcely an area under this appropriation request that cannot take a reduction and still perform its required operation effectively. A major portion of all civilian personnel are employed in the areas of this appropriation request and a better utilization of such civilian personnel would produce better results and at a lesser cost."

(2) The committee recommended the elimination of an item of \$345,000 for public information earmarked for transfer to the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and a reduction of 50 percent of the remaining funds carried in this appropriation for public information activities.

(3) There is over-obligating of maintenance and operations items during the last 2 months of the fiscal year. "The Committee is of the opinion that by better

administration throughout the year and a better utilization at the proper time of the funds available better results will be obtained.

Let me refer first to number (1) of the above comments of the House committee.

First, it will be noted that the House committee did not recommend specific cuts in the various "maintenance and operations" subitems. The committee proposed a blanket cut of \$600,000,000, which amount presumably was to be saved by getting what the Air Force needs but getting it for less money.

DRIVE FOR EFFICIENCY AND SAVINGS

I believe that we may have misled the House committee, in particular through the testimony of General Rawlings, commanding general of the Air Matériel Command, who explained to the Committee at considerable length the steps he had taken and was taking in the Air Matériel Command to get things on the cheapest possible basis. I fear that the House committee understood this to mean that our estimates for fiscal year 1953 did not give effect to these savings which General Rawlings was talking of. In fact, they do. All of our estimates for "Maintenance and operations," as well as every other item in the budget, are based upon our best calculation as to how we can apply efficient methods to get things cheaper. Thus, if we are compelled to accept a cut of \$600,000,000, we will have to cut out essential "Maintenance and operations" items. I wish we could get the same thing for less money, but I feel it my duty to report to this committee that the effect of efficiencies underway and projected are already included in our estimates. I also feel it is my duty to assure the committee that our drive for efficiency in the Air Matériel Command under General Rawlings will continue with vigor and that if any savings can be made—without cutting out vital elements—we will make them. But I do urge the committee not to cut this item under a misapprehension.

DISTRIBUTION OF REDUCTIONS

Secondly, as I have said, the House made the blanket cut of \$600,000,000 without allocating it among the various subitems of "Maintenance and operations." The Air Force accordingly has tentatively allocated this and the \$28,026,858 floor cut among the various subitems in order to find out how it could be applied—if we have to take it—in such a way as to produce the minimum damage to the operating ability of the Air Force. The following table shows our estimate as to how the cut would be applied if we have to take it.

Reductions in the following:

Spare parts and petroleum for operation of aircraft.....	\$180, 000, 000
Other types of equipment and supplies to operate the aircraft and the bases.....	120, 000, 000
The cost of maintaining the aircraft at depots.....	163, 026, 858
Cost of maintaining the training bases.....	60, 000, 000
Cost of maintaining the operational bases.....	80, 000, 000
Cost of maintaining the research and testing bases.....	7, 000, 000
Cost of carrying out the Air Force medical program.....	15, 000, 000
Overhead cost at commands and headquarters level for all maintenance and operations.....	2, 655, 000
Total.....	627, 681, 858

I shall not discuss each of the above items in detail. I shall instead point out three of the more important ones as illustrations.

OPERATION OF AIRCRAFT

First the operation of aircraft cut of \$180,000,000. This money would be used by the Air Force to provide the gas, oil, lubricants and spare parts which are necessary to get the aircraft into the air. These spare parts and petroleum products have a direct relationship to the number of hours that are flown by the aircraft. Any reduction in these funds automatically reduces the hours we will be able to fly in the Air Force, and this in turn affects the ability of the various combat commands to train for their combat missions and for the Training Command to train properly the required number of personnel. This item also includes the funds which are required to build up the reserve stocks of gas and oil at our forward overseas bases. If these forward reserves were not in place, the ability of the Strategic Air Command to perform its function would be seriously curtailed.

MAINTENANCE EQUIPMENT AND SUPPLIES

The second item I shall cover is the cut in the "Maintenance, equipment, and supply" item of \$120,000,000. These funds provide the equipment that must be in the hands of the units in the Air Force to permit them to maintain and operate the aircraft in these units. Such items as parachutes and G suits required in our high-performance combat aircraft are found in this item. It is from these funds that the spare parts for the maintenance of crash fire trucks, tugs and ground powered vehicles so necessary to our highly complicated aircraft are provided.

LOGISTICAL SUPPORT

The third item is the logistic support money where the cut is in the amount of \$163,026,858. The funds in this item cover the operation of the depot maintenance and supply system of the Air Force throughout the world. These funds provide for the overhaul of aircraft engines and for major depot reconditioning and maintenance of aircraft and equipment. It is from this item that our funds to pay for the transportation within fiscal year 1953 of some 200,000 tons of supplies from factory to depot to the bases where they are needed must be provided.

The foregoing three items are merely illustrations. They are, however, enough, I think, to show how serious the cut in "Maintenance and operations" is. For it is obvious that this cut will strike at some of the most important operations of the Air Force, such as the number of hours which Air Force planes will be able to fly during fiscal year 1953.

REDUCTION IN FLYING HOURS

My best information is that these cuts would reduce the number of flying hours by more than 10 percent.

A reduction of flying hours of this importance has to be prorated over all the flying activities of the Air Force and will certainly damage the ability of the Air Force to train its pilots the way they ought to be trained.

The reduction in flying hours will reduce the ability of the Air Defense Command to intercept and shoot down enemy bombers.

The reduction in flying hours will reduce the ability of the Tactical Air Command to do its job of getting air superiority over the battlefield and support the ground forces in the ground battle.

The reduction in flying hours will reduce the ability of the crews of the Strategic Air Command by denying them the training which is necessary to have them ready for their critical and delicate job.

The reduction in the number of spares and spare parts and the reduction in the maintenance of aircraft would mean that fewer jet engines would be overhauled, fewer parts will be available to return airplanes to condition. As a result the safety of flying will be reduced, the accident rate will be increased, and the Air Force will be generally less efficient—all because of insufficient time in the air for training and for practicing and because the aircraft will be maintained below the proper minimum standards.

It is not sensible or economical to provide bases, schools, and aircraft and flying units and then prohibit their proper utilization by cutting down the money necessary to have them operate.

If the committee desires, Under Secretary Gilpatric and members of the Air Staff are available to discuss this item of "Maintenance and operations" in the fullest detail.

EFFICIENCY BOUND TO SUFFER

I now refer back to my citation of the remarks of the House committee about the reduction in "Maintenance and operations." I have attempted to answer the statement of the House committee that we could get the necessary end product with \$600,000,000 less money. I have tried to persuade this committee that this is not possible; and that instead we would have to face the grievous cuts in efficiency of operation of the Air Force which I have just described. Two other points of the House committee remain to be answered.

The second point of the House committee was that \$345,000 for "Public information" should be eliminated. The Air Force accepts this cut in toto.

The House committee made a third point, namely that there was an over obligation of the "Maintenance and operations" item during the last 2 months of each fiscal year. I have inquired into this matter and am informed that no such disorderly method of obligating "Maintenance and operations" funds exists Air Force-wide. There are a few examples of the piling up of obligating action at the end of the year, but these are small in amount and should not be used as a basis of generalization as to the Air Force-wide obligations with respect to this "Maintenance and operations." This matter can be covered in all the detail the committee may desire in later presentations of Under Secretary Gilpatric and members of the Air Staff.

IV. THE ITEM OF AIRCRAFT AND RELATED PROCUREMENT

If we can have a restoration of the "Military personnel" item and the "Maintenance and operations" item, then the item of "Aircraft and related procurement" will become the limiting factor in the build-up of the Air Force toward the 143-wing force.

V. THE ITEM OF MAJOR PROCUREMENT OTHER THAN AIRCRAFT

The Air Force asked for \$1.3 billion for "Major procurement other than aircraft." The House committee recommended an over-all reduction of \$170,000,000. An additional \$130,000,000 was cut from this item on the House floor. This is the \$130,000,000 item I have already discussed as part of the three cuts made on the House floor for the purpose of preventing the Air Force from setting up an alleged third supply system. I repeat only that if these supplies are taken out of this item they will have to be deducted from the articles which the Air Force should buy and have, if it is to operate properly. It has nothing to do with the supply system. I accordingly request the restoration of this \$130,000,000.

Now about the \$170,000,000 cut recommended by the committee: The committee states, in substance, its reasons for the \$170,000,000 cut as follows:

(1) It is not the intention of the committee to reduce items such as ammunition "but the procurement of such items may be had through less cost if proper management procedures and careful planning of requirements are followed."

(2) In the field of ground powered and marine equipment, major reductions can be accomplished through better utilization of the vehicles and equipment and better management in their use. The tables of organization and equipment for such ground powered and marine equipment can be cut down. These tables, it is said, were written years ago and are not up to date.

(3) The procurement of electronics and communications equipment "falls into the area where major savings should be made through better procurement practices and better management contracts."

(4) For training equipment and numerous items under the heading of "Other major equipment," the same major savings "should be made through better procurement practices and better management contracts."

WHERE COULD SAVINGS BE MADE?

The Air Force has carefully reviewed these suggestions in an earnest effort to see where savings could be made. It is my duty to report to you that we are unable to assure this committee that any savings are possible in these items without a reduction in the number of articles to be procured and in a reduction in the efficient operation of the 143-wing force. As I shall point out, we are making vigorous efforts to effect reductions in every item that we procure; and if they can be made they will be. But I cannot take the responsibility of forecasting that we can make reductions in this item without interfering with the ability of the Air Force to do its job.

DISTRIBUTION OF REDUCTION

The Air Force has studied how it could handle the \$300,000,000 cut if it is to be made and decided that the minimum damage would result from the following reductions:

Ammunition.....	\$60, 000, 000
Reduction of ground powered equipment.....	50, 000, 000
Reduction in electronic equipment, mainly for radar screen.....	70, 000, 000
Reduction in training equipment such as mock-ups for K bombsights and training equipment such as flight simulators.....	30, 000, 000
Reductions in other major equipment such as meteorological, test, flying field and shop, and classified atomic equipment.....	90, 000, 000

Briefly summarizing the effect of these cuts:

(1) The ammunition cuts affect mainly the new guns which are now being developed and installed in the B-47 and the F-84. If the cut is sustained the result will be that these planes, if they were called upon to operate in combat, would not have sufficient ammunition to fight. There would also be, in peacetime, inadequate training ammunition. I believe that the suggestion that we could get the same amount of ammunition that we need for less money comes from a misunderstanding of the presentation of General Rawlings of the Air Matériel Command. He pointed out our current attempts to produce economies in the air matériel operation; but I believe that the House committee failed to understand that the amounts requested have given effect to all of his forecast economies. The impression seems to have been that he was forecasting economies for the future which had not been attempted in the past and were not currently part of air matériel practice. This impression is incorrect.

(2) Ground powered and marine equipment: The Air Staff has assured me, after full discussion of the matter, that it is not possible to achieve further reductions in ground powered and marine equipment by lowering the tables of equipment. The amounts requested for this item give effect to the current examinations being made of our tables of equipment by teams which have gone throughout the whole Air Force structure from Korea to Washington for the very purpose of making cuts in these tables of equipment. In short, the figures submitted are at a lower level than would normally be estimated and do give effect to hopes for economies in the tables of equipment during the forthcoming fiscal year.

(3) Electronics and communication equipment: It is suggested by the House committee that major savings could be made through better procurement practices and better management contracts. I believe that this statement again refers to the presentation by General Rawlings in which he described the past and current practices of the Air Force. I repeat that the figures as submitted do give effect to General Rawlings' estimate of the savings that can be effected through good management and procurement procedures on which I have already commented.

(4) Training equipment and "Other major equipment": The House committee suggested that major savings could be made in these items through better procurement practices and better management contracts. So far as the training equipment is concerned, I am unable to discover just how any savings can be made through better practices. I think that this is another case where the committee misunderstood the presentation of General Rawlings and did not realize that General Rawlings' testimony as to better procurement practices referred to practices which he hoped to put into effect and to which effect was given in the Air Force budget estimates.

The item of "Other major equipment" to which the committee refers consists in the main of special equipment for the meteorological support of the Air Force, development of and procurement of new photographic and other equipment so vital to our reconnaissance operation, and one major item in which I am sure you will be interested, classified equipment necessary to the atomic-energy program of the Air Force. Again, I was unable to discover where any major savings

could be made in these very important items. I think again there was a misapprehension as to the nature of General Rawlings' testimony.

NO LARGE STOCKS

One other general point may be mentioned with respect to this item of "Major procurement other than aircraft." We have not been asking for large amounts of stocks of the various things in this item. On the contrary, through a series of cuts from the original Air Force figure which came into headquarters, a reduction of about 50 percent in this item was effected within the Air Force itself so as to have all these items only at the safe margin. Particularly is this true in the electronics industry, where we have been told there would be a shortage of production capacity for these items. I feel justified in recommending urgently to you the restoration of all of this item.

DELAYING EFFECT OF REDUCTION

One word as to the delaying effect of the \$300,000,000 reduction.

This delaying effect is governed by lead time. For all items other than electronic equipment and flight simulators and certain types of communication equipment, the lead time is a year or less. Therefore, a reduction on these items would not have the effect (assuming that we get the items restored in the fiscal year 1954 budget) of delaying the date of readiness of the Air Force beyond the middle of calendar 1955. However, as to the items of electronics equipment such as heavy radar sets, the lead time runs in the neighborhood of 2 years. Therefore, a restoration of these items in the fiscal 1954 budget would not enable us to have the 143-wing force in full readiness by the end of fiscal year 1955, but would push forward its date of readiness to the neighborhood of the end of fiscal year 1956.

But even as to the items which do not extend the date of readiness beyond the end of fiscal year 1955, the effect of the reduction will be to interfere with the state of readiness between now and the end of fiscal year 1955. I consider this undesirable.

VI. THE ITEM OF RESERVE PERSONNEL REQUIREMENTS AND AIR NATIONAL GUARD

The House bill cut the appropriations for our Reserve components by eliminating \$2,200,000 in "Reserve personnel requirements," and \$10,000,000 in funds for the Air National Guard. The Air Force has accepted the cut in Reserve personnel as recommended by the House committee since there is a reasonable doubt as to our ability to recruit to the fiscal year 1953 programed strength. We wish, however, to ask for a restoration of the Air National Guard item. It is not contested, I believe, that this sum is necessary to develop properly the Air National Guard. We must reconstitute the Air National Guard without delay after it returns to inactive status. I submit that the guard has proved its worth during the last 20 months in Korea and elsewhere, and should be supported.

VII. CONTINGENCIES

I shall be glad to explain this item to the committee, off the record.

VIII. CONCLUSION

I request the restoration of all the Air Force reclama of \$1,644,420,858 in order to bring into being the modernized 143-wing force by the end of fiscal year 1955.

In making this request, I wish to again emphasize that, in my opinion, the time as of which the 143-wing force should be ready is today. If the date of July 1, 1954, is to be regarded as a critical date as of which we should be ready, I say that this date can be accepted only because it was impossible to have the 143-wing force ready at any earlier point in time. That date of July 1, 1954, should not, in my opinion, be regarded as the real point in time as of which we need this 143-wing force. It is and was only the date as of which we could get it. Now the date as of which we can get it is midcalendar 1955. But this should not obscure the fact that the date we ought to have it is today.

IX. COMMENTS ON SECTION 638 OF H. R. 7391

Section 638 of H. R. 7391, the so-called Smith amendment, approaches the problem from a different angle. The general House cuts make specific reductions in our appropriations. The Smith amendment has a limitation of a different kind; it specifies that the Military Establishment (the three service departments and the Department of Defense) shall not spend more than \$46 billion during fiscal year 1953.

The Smith amendment did not allocate this limitation as among the services. It has accordingly been tentatively divided by the Department of Defense. The spending limit assigned to the Air Force is \$17.4 billion.

In fact, the Air Force will require \$19.2 billion of expenditures during fiscal year 1953 if it gets the \$20.7 general appropriation and the \$1.5 Public Works appropriation which it is currently asking from Congress. If section 638 is enacted, the effect therefore will be to cut off the difference between \$19.2 and \$17.4 billion, or \$1.8 billion from expenditures during fiscal year 1953.

PROCUREMENT SUFFERS MOST

The burden will fall mainly on the long lead items. The reason for this is that the expenditures that have to be made during the fiscal year 1953—such as the pay of personnel and current consumption of petroleum—will have to be first honored. Thereafter will come the items which are substantially completed. For example, an aircraft which is almost finished at the beginning of the fiscal year obviously should be completed in order to avoid a reckless waste of public funds. The burden, therefore, will fall in the main on the longer lead-time items—in other words, on those items which have either only gotten started or have not been started at all.

The effect of section 638, as a part of H. R. 7391, is shown graphically on the accompanying chart.

Section 638 in the main aggravates the House appropriation cuts during the period January 1953 to June 30, 1955. As will be seen from the chart, the effect of section 638 added to the House appropriation cuts will be to reduce our modernized wings as of fiscal 1953 by about 14 percent; to reduce our modernized wings at the end of fiscal 1954 by about 25 percent; to reduce our modernized wings as of the end of fiscal 1955 by about 18 percent from the planned strength of the Air Force to achieve the modern 143-wing force. After the end of fiscal year 1955, as the chart shows, section 638 will have spent its effect on long-lead procurement—unless, of course, an expenditure limitation is added in fiscal year 1954. If this is done along the lines of the present section 638, we may say that the modernized force of 143 wings will never be attained.

It is this cut in the striking power of the Air Force which is the most serious effect of section 638. I may, however, make reference to certain detailed effects on the Air Force if section 638 were enacted. Secretary Lovett has already covered this matter quite fully. I will emphasize certain points which bear particularly on the Air Force problem.

An expenditure limitation cannot be appraised except as it applies to a specific appropriation; and I am referring section 638 to the Air Force's request for \$20.7 billion for general purposes and for \$1.5 billion for public works, both for fiscal year 1953. These appropriations, as I have already said, would produce a spending by the Air Force of \$19.2 billion during fiscal year 1953 with only \$17.4 billion available, and would show a deficit of \$1.8 billion.


EFFECT OF EXPENDITURE LIMITATION

The effect of this in specifics would be to weaken the posture of the Air Force by a loss of modern aircraft for 10 combat wings during fiscal year 1953 and fiscal year 1954; would reduce aircraft production by at least 3,000 aircraft during the 18 months' period of January 1, 1953, to June 30, 1954; would destroy all of the momentum which has now been obtained in the aircraft industry; would produce an operational training level which would not permit even the wings in being to be in a satisfactory and safe condition; and would substantially reduce the possibility of these wings carrying out their assigned tasks should they be called upon to engage in combat.

These things, grievous as they are, are, however, not the matters on which I believe the committee should focus its attention. The important point of the Smith amendment is that—whether applied to the \$20.7 billion budget as submitted by the President or to the budget as reduced by the House cuts in appropriations—it drives the date of readiness of a force which should be in full readiness by the middle of 1954 well out into 1956, and indeed, if coupled with the House appropriation cuts, toward the end of fiscal year 1957.

TOTAL AND MODERN COMBAT WINGS

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ESTIMATE.



FORCES

STRATEGIC

BOMBER

RECON

FIGHTER

AIR DEFENSE

FIGHTER

TACTICAL

BOMBER

RECON

FIGHTER


LEGEND

— MODERN WINGS
WITH INDICATED
APPROPRIATIONS.


—•— MODERN WINGS
WITH \$19 BILLION
APPROPRIATIONS
SUBJECT TO SMITH
AMMENDMENT.

--- TOTAL WINGS

PRESIDENT'S ESTIMATE.




ESTIMATE AS REDUCED BY HOUSE.



CRITICAL PERIOD

PERFORMANCE RECORD



UNITED STATES AIR FORCE

CHIEF OF BUREAU
 MAINTENANCE
 AIR FORCE
 WASHINGTON, D. C.
 1945